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Abstract
We study equity in economies where agents are endowed with differ-
ent, non transferable, personal talents. To compensate them for such
differences a given amount of money needs to be shared among them.
We axiomatize a family of social orderings over allocations based on
efficiency, fairness and robustness properties. Taking into account in-
centive constraints we derive the optimal policy: individuals with the
same talent need to be equally compensated and only people whose
level of talent is below a certain threshold should receive a positive
compensation.
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We study the fair allocation of a given amount of a one-dimensional,
divisible resource (e.g. money) among a finite population of individuals in
order to compensate them for their differences in a non-transferable, personal
endowment. Such a personal endowment can be either an innate talent or
a handicap and can be exemplified by features of human capital like health
condition, bodily characteristics or social background.
For instance, one could think of the problem of a social planner willing
to provide assistance to people with disabilities by distributing among them
a given amount of available resources.
%disability
benefits
•−33%
•−46%
•−66%
•−74%
•−99% •−100%
Figure 1: The Italian social security scheme of benefits for people with
disabilities.
In several countries, doctors evaluate the mental and physical condition
of individuals with handicaps. An index is thus computed which determines
to which extent the applicant is able to work. Some benefits are then as-
signed as a function of this parameter. For example, the compensation
scheme used in Italy is illustrated in figure 11. The vertical axis represents
the degree of inability to work, whereas the horizontal axis represents bun-
dles of benefits. The shape of the curve gives us a clear idea of how the
compensation policy is designed: the bundle of benefits grows cumulatively
as the level of handicap increases. A significant part of the applicants, peo-
ple with a level of disability between 0 and 32%, do not receive any kind
1The website http://www.disabili.it gives a precise description of the compensation
scheme, the figure is mine and it has only a descriptive purpose.
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of compensation. People with a level of disability between 33% and 73%
are entitled to some monetary and non-monetary benefits that cumulate
depending to the severity of their condition (i.e., specific medical supplies,
priority in the unemployment, free drugs). People with a disability between
74% and 99% also receive a monthly monetary subsidy but only until their
retirement age and provided their earnings are below a certain threshold.
Individuals with a disability of 100% receive the same amount of money
permanently and independetly of their wealth condition. The figure raises
several questions. Is it fair to leave a relatively big share of the population
without any compensation? Is the compensation individuals with severe
disabilities receive enough?
We will show that normative arguments and incentive-compatibility con-
straints give a partial justification to such a compensation scheme. In par-
ticular, it might indeed be optimal to give a monetary compensation only to
people whose level of disability is above a certain threshold. Such a thresh-
old depends not only on the relative scarcity of the resources to share, but
also on the willingness of the social planner to give priority to individuals
with higher disability. On the other hand the strong discontinuities in such
a scheme, namely, the fact that two individuals with a non-negligible differ-
ence in their level of talent might end up receiving the same compensation,
does not find any support in our analysis.
Recent theories of justice agree that inequalities in agents’outcomes might
arise both from differences in characteristics they should not be held respon-
sible for and from differences in characteristics they should be held respon-
sible for. They all arrive at the common conclusion that society should only
try to reduce inequalities deriving from differences of the former type2.
We will assume that each individual is endowed with two characteristics:
her talent t, for which she is not responsible and her preferences R for which
she is, since they embody her subjective evaluation of her condition (namely
the amount of resources she receives and her talent).
The purpose of our analysis is to look, on one side, for a distribution
mechanism that would allocate a given amount of available external re-
sources M in order to correct inequalities deriving from differences in talent
solely. This idea goes under the name of principle of compensation (Fleur-
baey [7], [8]). Notice that in performing such a compensation we cannot
disregard individual preferences: if all the individuals in a society deem
equivalent being endowed with a given level of talent, rather than another
2See for instance Rawls [20], Dworkin [6], Arneson [1], Cohen [4], van Parijs [24],
Roemer [21] among others.
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one, then differences in talents do not need to be compensated.
On the other side, we endorse the idea that differences due to character-
istics that fall into the domain of responsibility should be treated neutrally:
this means that, in our case, the distribution mechanism should give the
same amount of resources to individuals with the same talent (but possi-
bly different preferences). This is the so called principle of natural reward
(Fleurbaey [7], [8])
To solve this problem, the literature has so far proposed allocation rules
(for a complete survey of the subject see Fleurbaey and Maniquet [11]). An
allocation rule specifies the set of optimal allocations as a function of the pa-
rameters of the problem: the population’s profile of talents, the population’s
profile of preferences and the available resources. Such allocation rules can
be enforced only on the basis of a full knowledge of the population’s profiles
of characteristics. Typically allocation rules are not perfectly implementable
because of incentive constraints.
Alternatively, one may look for social ordering functions specifying a
complete ranking of all the allocations as a function of the parameters of
the problem.
This approach has been already applied to several economic environ-
ments: for instance Maniquet and Sprumont [17], [18] construct orderings of
allocations in economies with one private good and one partially excludable
nonrival good. Fleurbaey and Maniquet [13], [14] consider a model where
agents have unequal production skills and different preferences and they
characterize purely ordinal social ordering functions which satisfy proper-
ties of compensation for inequalities in skills and equal access to resources for
all preferences. Fleurbaey and Maniquet [12] construct social preferences in
the canonical economic problem of dividing a bundle of commodities among
individuals with different preferences.
In this paper, we follow the same approach by proposing a way to rank
alternatives based on efficiency, fairness and robustness properties. It is ex-
plained below how it is possible to embody the principle of compensation
and the principle of natural reward into a variety of specific, precise axioms.
It will be clear soon that it is not possible to find a social ordering function
that satisfies both the principles. Let us immediately emphasize that such
an incompatibility does not represent a dead end for our analysis. It is a
purely introductory result telling us that we have to make a choice between
these two incompatible principles: we have to chose which one should have
priority over the other. We will show how axioms embodying the princi-
ple of compensation and axioms weakly embodying the principle of natural
reward together with efficiency and separability conditions (with some vari-
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ants, separability conditions state that indifferent agents should not matter
in the social evaluation of two alternatives) single out a specific welfare rep-
resentation of agents’ preferences and a specific way of ranking alternatives.
Once an ordering of the allocations is available, it is always possible to
produce a precise policy recommendation, even if the social planner faces
informational constraints (or any other kind of constraint). We will show in
fact, that maximizing the ordering, under the relevant incentive constraints,
gives us, as mentioned earlier, a specific suggestion about the way resources
should be allocated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the model and
the relevant notation. Section 2 describes the requirements imposed on the
social preferences and describes logical relations between them. Section 3
deals with social orderings. Section 4 studies the optimal allocation of re-
sources under informational constraints. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix
provides the proofs.
1 The Model
The model we analyze is derived from Fleurbaey [7], [8]. We consider a
set of economies with a finite set of agents N ⊆ N. A given amount M ∈
R++ has to be shared among them through monetary transfers of amount
mi ∈ R+. Each agent in the economy is characterized by a fixed, non
transferable talent ti ∈ T . Let T = [tL, tH ] ⊂ R be the set of possible talents.
Moreover each agent is endowed with a personal preference ordering Ri over
pairs (m, t) ∈ R+ × T . A pair (m, t) will be called hereafter an extended
bundle. This means that individuals are assumed to be able to compare
extended bundles of individuals with a talent different from their own. In
this framework one can think of preferences as to valuation functions: each
individual is able to give a valuation of her own condition and compare
it with someone else’s. The individual preference ordering Ri is assumed
to be continuous and strictly monotonic with respect to mi and ti, strict
preference and indifference will be respectively denoted by Pi and Ii. Let R
denote the set of such preferences. We will say that individual preferences
R ∈ R exhibit a higher aversion to lack of talent than R′ ∈ R (R A R′) if
they satisfy the following property: for any t, t′ ∈ T and for any m,m′ ∈ RN+
we have
t′ > t and (m′, t′)R′(m, t) =⇒ (m′, t′)P (m, t)
t′ < t and (m′, t′)R (m, t) =⇒ (m′, t′)P ′(m, t)
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that is, any pair of indifference curves, one for R and one for R′ cross at
most once in the (m, t) space.
An economy is denoted by e = (tN , RN ,M), where tN = (ti)i∈N is the
population’s profile of talents, RN = (Ri)i∈N is the profile of individual
preferences and M is the available social endowment. The domain of all
economies satisfying the above assumptions will be denoted by D. An allo-
cation is a vector mN = (mi)i∈N ∈ RN+ . The first concern of this paper is
to construct a social ordering of (feasible and non feasible) allocations for
all economies in the domain. A social ordering, for any given e ∈ D, is a
complete and transitive ranking defined over allocations. A social ordering
function R associates every admissible economy e = (tN , RN ,M) ∈ D with
a social ordering R(e). So for an economy e = (tN , RN ,M) ∈ D and two
allocations mN and m′N ∈ RN+ we write mNR(e)m′N to denote that mN is
(socially) at least as good as m′N . Strict social preference and indifference
will be respectively denoted by P (e) and I(e).
tL
tH
t˜
tk
tj
m
•
m1k
•
m2k
•
m2j
•
m1j
•t̂1k
•
m̂2j
•
m̂2k
•
m̂1j
Figure 2:
To illustrate our approach consider the simple economy depicted in figure
2. We only have two agents, j and k, with different talents, tj and tk. We
consider two allocations, (m1j ,m
1
k) and (m
2
j ,m
2
k) and we want to rank them.
The social ordering function we propose in this paper works in the following
way. First, a reference talent t˜ is chosen. Then, for each i ∈ {j, k}, q ∈ {1, 2}
we consider the individual level of resource m̂qi ≥ 0 which would make the
agents accept the reference talent t˜ instead of their current situation (mqi , ti).
As we can see from the figure, such a value does not exist for agent k at
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(m1j ,m
1
k). In order to evaluate the situation of agent k, we then consider
the level of talent t̂1k that would make her accept a null transfer instead
of her current situation. More formally, t̂1k is the level of talent such that
(0, t̂1k)Ik(m
1
k, tk). To summarize, for each agent i we can have a continuous
numerical representation of her preferences over pairs (m, t) ∈ R+ × T :
ÊRi,et (mi, ti) =
{
m̂i if m̂i exists
t̂i − t˜ otherwise.
Finally the vectors of such welfare representations are compared using the
maximin rule: in our example we have that (m2j ,m
2
k) is strictly better than
(m1j ,m
1
k) since min{Ê2j , Ê2k} > min{Ê1j , Ê1k}. We will prove in Section 4
that both this particular welfare representation and the way of ranking al-
ternatives are singled out by a specific combination of axioms. More pre-
cisely this is what we obtain if we combine axioms embodying the principle of
compensation, axioms weakly embodying the principle of natural reward to-
gether with efficiency and robustness requirements. Indeed, if we measured
welfare differently, keeping the same ranking criterion, we would not be able
to obtain a compensation minded social ordering function. Consider, for ex-
ample, the following way of ranking alternatives. Take two allocations mN
and m′N and order the extended bundles according to a reference preference
R˜ ∈ R in such a way that (mi, ti)R˜(mi+1, ti+1) and (m′i, ti)R˜(m′i+1, ti+1)
for all i ∈ (1, ..., n − 1) then, m′N is socially (strictly) preferred to mN if
(m′n, tn)P˜ (mn, tn)3. This social ordering function fails to satisfy the princi-
ple of compensation (except for agents whose individual preference ordering
is equal to the reference one) and on the contrary gives priority to the prin-
ciple of natural reward.
This duality is actually due to a basic incompatibility between the two
ethical principles that was already pointed out by Fleurbaey [8] in the first
best framework and, as will be proven in section 3, it is still present in the
second best framework.
On the other hand, suppose we keep the welfare representation proposed
in the first place but we drop the maximin criterion. We could, for example,
take the welfare-level vectors underlying two different allocations and calcu-
late their Gini index (we will consider only the striclty positive elements).
The allocation with the smallest Gini index will be socially preferred to the
other one. This ranking criterion is, to some extent, compensation minded
3notice that the agents with the worst-off extended bundles respect to eR, at the two
allocations, are not necessarily the same.
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but it is not necessarily consistent with an infinite degree of inequality aver-
sion. As we will see later this is a feature we are forced to accept if we
combine together compensation and robustness requirements.
2 Axioms
This section defines the properties we want to impose on our social ordering
function. We start with a basic efficiency condition. The Strong Pareto
axiom takes a very intuitive form here since talents are fixed and resources
are one-dimensional. Notice moreover that all allocations exhausting the
resources are efficient.
Strong Pareto. For all e ∈ D and mN ,m′N ∈ RN+ , if mi ≥ m′i for
all i ∈ N , then mNR(e)m′N ; if, in addition, mi > m′i for some i ∈ N , then
mNP (e)m′N .
The second axiom we introduce is a property of robustness of the social
ordering with respect to changes in the set of agents. We require that
adding or removing agents who receive the same bundle in two different al-
locations should not modify the social ordering. This axiom was introduced
by Fleurbaey and Maniquet [12] and is reminiscent of the Separability con-
dition, quite familiar in social choice, due to d’Aspremont and Gevers [2]
and of the Consistency condition, widely used in the theory of fair allocation
(see Thomson [23]), except that it does not require to delete the resources
consumed by the removed agents from the social endowment.
Separation. For all e ∈ D and mN ,m′N ∈ RN+ , if there is i ∈ N such
that mi = m′i, then
mNR(e)m′N ⇐⇒ mN\{i}R(tN\{i}, RN\{i},M)m′N\{i}.
We can now turn to the fairness conditions expressing respectively the
ideas of compensation and natural reward. Assume first that there are two
agents, j and k, with equal preferences and a different talent. Assume also
that they both consider agent j’s extended bundle strictly better than agent
k’s. Assume finally that the monetary compensation received by agent j
is reduced by a given amount and the one received by agent k is increased
by the same amount but they both still consider j’s extended bundle to be
better than k’s. The allocation we obtain must be, according to the prin-
ciple of compensation, socially preferred to the former one since it reduces
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inequalities exclusively deriving from differences in talent.
Equal Preferences Transfer. For all e ∈ D and mN ,m′N ∈ RN+ , if
there exist j, k ∈ N and ∆ ∈ R+ such that Rj = Rk,
m′j = mj −∆, m′k = mk + ∆ and (m′j , tj)Pj(m′k, tk),
with mi = m′i for all i 6= j, k, then m′NP (e)mN .
We also consider a quite natural strengthening of this axiom: instead
of requiring the preferences of the agents to be identical, we simply require
that agents’ indifference curves trough their extended bundles in mN and
m′N are nested. For each i ∈ N let L((mi, ti), Ri) and U((mi, ti), Ri) denote
respectively the (closed) lower contour set and the (closed) upper contour
set of Ri at (mi, ti).
Nested Preferences Transfer. For all e ∈ D and mN ,m′N ∈ RN+ if
there exist j, k ∈ N and ∆ ∈ R+ such that
U((m′j , tj), Rj)
⋂
L((m′k, tk), Rk) = ∅,
m′j = mj − ∆ and m′k = mk + ∆, with mi = m′i for all i 6= j, k, then
m′NP (e)mN .
The rationale of this axiom is that, in both allocations, one of the two
agents envies the other (not only at her actual talent but also at any hy-
pothetical level of talent she may have), so performing the transfer actually
reduces resources inequality.
Let us turn now to the principle of natural reward. Assume there are two
agents with the same talent (and possibly different preferences) who receive
a different monetary compensation: performing an equalizing transfer that
reduces such an inequality should be considered a social improvement.
Equal Talent Transfer. For all e ∈ D and mN ,m′N ∈ RN+ , if there exist
j, k ∈ N and ∆ ∈ R+ such that tj = tk and
mk + ∆ = m′k < m
′
j = mj −∆,
with mi = m′i for all i 6= j, k, then m′NP (e)mN .
The fairness conditions presented so far are an adaptation to this framework
of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer, widely used in income inequality
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theory. They are all biased toward equality but consistent with any degree
of inequality aversion.
Our first result shows that the compensation and natural reward require-
ments we have presented so far are incompatible.
Lemma 1 On the domain D, no social ordering function satisfies Equal
Preferences Transfer and Equal Talent Transfer.
We propose now an alternative way of capturing the ethical goals of com-
pensation and natural reward that is inspired by Suppes’ grading principles
(Suppes [22]) and was introduced in the literature by Maniquet [16]. The
first property, called Equal Preferences Permutation, requires that permut-
ing the outcomes of two agents having the same preferences but possibly
different talents gives us two socially equivalent allocations. Indeed, accord-
ing to the principle of compensation there is no reason why society should
prefer one of the two allocations: agents with the same responsibility char-
acteristics should be treated anonymously.
Equal Preferences Permutation. For all e ∈ D and mN ,m′N ∈ RN+ ,
if there exist j, k ∈ N such that Rj = Rk,
(mj , tj)Ij(m′k, tk) and (mk, tk)Ij(m
′
j , tj),
with mi = m′i for all i 6= j, k, then mNI(e)m′N .
The next axiom requires, according to the principle of natural reward, that
permuting the bundles of two agents having the same talent but possibly
different preferences does not alter the value of the allocation in the social
ranking. Again the justification is clear: as those agents have the same com-
pensation parameters, they should be treated anonymously. By permuting
the transfers they receive, we obtain an equally good, or equally bad, allo-
cation.
Equal Talent Permutation. For all e ∈ D and mN ,m′N ∈ RN+ , if there
exist j, k ∈ N such that tj = tk,
mk = m′j and mj = m
′
k,
with mi = m′i for all i 6= j, k, then mNI(e)m′N .
The next result shows that the incompatibility between compensation and
responsibility extends beyond Lemma 1 since it has nothing to do with the
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degree of inequality aversion exhibited by the axioms that were involved
there: also requirements like Equal Preferences Permutation and Equal Tal-
ent Permutation, which are consistent with any degree of inequality aver-
sion (even a negative one), are in fact incompatible if combined with Strong
Pareto.
Lemma 2 On the domain D, no social ordering function satisfies Strong
Pareto, Equal Preferences Permutation and Equal Talent Permutation.
Similar incompatibilities between compensation and natural reward, in
a second best framework, have already been pointed out by Fleurbaey and
Maniquet [13] in a different economic environment.
Let us stress again that these negative results are purely introductory
ones, they imply that we have to chose which of the two principles must have
priority. As we shall see, this choice has an important consequence concern-
ing the the degree of inequality aversion that will be exhibited finally by the
social ordering function. In fact, if we decide to give priority to the principle
of compensation, then, combining together a mild egalitarian requirement
like Nested Preferences Transfer, with axioms that are essentially neutral
with respect to inequality aversion, determines an extreme form of inequal-
ity aversion described by the following axiom.
Nested Preferences Priority. For all e ∈ D and mN ,m′N ∈ RN+ , if
there exist j, k ∈ N such that
(mj , tj)Pj(m′j , tj)Pj(m
′
k, tk)Pk(mk, tk)
U((m′j , tj), Rj)
⋂
L((m′k, tk), Rk) = ∅,
with mi = m′i for all i 6= j, k, then m′NP (e)mN .
Let us emphasize that this property represents an extreme strengthening
of Nested Preferences Transfer. It states that an inequality reduction is al-
ways socially desirable, provided that indifference curves are nested at the
bundles, even when the gain from mk to m′k is very small and the loss from
mj to m′j is quite large.
Lemma 3 On the domain D, if a SOF satisfies Nested Preferences Trans-
fer, Equal Preferences Permutation and Separation then it satisfies Nested
Preferences Priority.
Results similar to this one can already be found in Fleurbay [9] and
Maniquet and Sprumont [17], [18]. They all show, in different economic
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environments, that combining together fairness conditions that exhibit a
limited aversion to inequality with robustness and efficiency conditions leads
to an infinite aversion to inequality.
The remarkable aspect here is that we reach a similar conclusion deal-
ing with a one-dimensional resource4. This makes the contrast with the
income inequality measurement framework, where combining the Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle with robustness requirements does not necessarily
lead to such extreme consequences (Chakravarty [5]), even stronger.
It is moreover interesting to notice that if we decide to give priority to
the principle of natural reward, we cannot find anything similar. In this
case, in fact, we would ”fall” in a purely one-dimensional framework were
we are eventually free to choose the degree of inequality aversion of the social
ordering function5.
The fact that we have decided to give priority to the principle of com-
pensation does not mean that we want to disregard completely the principle
of natural reward. In the last part of this section we will propose two al-
ternative weakenings of Equal Talent Transfer that represent somehow the
strongest natural reward axioms that would not clash with Equal Prefer-
ences Transfer.
The impossibility pointed out by Lemma 1 makes it clear that, if we
do not want to violate Equal Preferences Transfer, then it is possible to
perform a redistribution between two agents with the same talent t who
receive a different monetary compensation at most for one t ∈ T . A first
option then, is to impose the full transfer condition only among agents with
a talent equal to some reference talent t˜ fixed arbitrarily. Alternatively, if
there are two agents j, k such that tj = tk < t˜ and one of them does not
receive a monetary compensation, while the other receives a positive one,
then we propose a minimal reward requirement: it must be always possible
to slightly reduce such a difference and the allocation we obtain is socially
preferred to the former one.
4Interestingly a similar result involving Equal Preference Transfer (and its Priority
version) could be obtained if we replace Separation with a different informational simplicity
axiom: Hansson Independence (Fleurbaey and Maniquet [14]). It says that the social
ranking of two allocations should remain unaffected by a change in individual preferences
which does not modify agents’ indifference curves at the bundles they receive in these
two allocations. Indeed if a social ordering function satisfies Equal Preferences Transfer,
Equal Preferences Permutation and Hannson Independence then it also satisfies Equal
Preferences Priority.
5We could, for example, compare allocations just by computing their Gini index. This
would satisfy Strong Pareto and Equal Talent Transfer (but it would violate Equal Pref-
erences Transfer).
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t˜-Equal Talent Transfer. For all e ∈ D, mN ,m′N ∈ RN+ , for at least
one t˜ ∈ T if there exist j, k ∈ N and ∆ ∈ R+ such that tj = tk = t˜ and
mj − ∆ = m′j > m′k = mk + ∆, with mi = m′i for all i 6= j, k, then
m′NP (e)mN
or
if there exist j, k ∈ N such that tj = tk < t˜, mj = 0, mk > 0 with
mi = m′i for all i 6= j, k, then there exists at least one ε ∈ R++ such
that ε = m′j < m
′
k = mk − ε and m′NP (e)mN .
The next axiom does not involve the choice of a reference talent. We still
consider a couple of agents with the same talent who receive a different
amount of resources. We say that it is socially desirable to perform a trans-
fer between them only if the recipient’s preferences exhibits a higher degree
of aversion to lack of talent than the donor’s preferences. Alternatively, if
there are two agents j, k such that tj = tk and one of them does not receive
a monetary compensation, while the other receives a positive one, then it
must be always possible to slightly reduce such a difference while obtaining
a social improvement.
Equal Talent Transfer to the Unhappy. for all e ∈ D and mN ,m′N ∈
RN+ , if there exist j, k ∈ N and ∆ ∈ R+ such that ti = tj, Rj A Ri and
mk + ∆ = m′k < m
′
j = mj − ∆, with mi = m′i for all i 6= j, k, then
m′NP (e)mN
or
if there exist j, k ∈ N such that tj = tk, mj = 0, mk > 0 with mi = m′i
for all i 6= j, k, then there exists at least one ε ∈ R++ such that : ε = m′j <
m′k = mk − ε and m′NP (e)mN .
3 Social Orderings
Before we show how combining together the axioms presented in the previous
section determines a specific way of ranking the social alternatives, we need
12
to introduce some piece of notation.
Assume a reference talent t˜ is chosen. For each agent i ∈ N and for
each mi ∈ R+ consider m̂i ≥ 0 such that (mi, ti)Ii(m̂i, t˜). As pointed in
the example in section 2, such a value does not necessarily exist. If this is
the case, consider the hypothetical level of talent t̂i such that (0, t̂)Ii(mi, ti).
Finally, for each i ∈ N consider the function
Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜) =
{
m̂i if m̂i exists
t̂i − t˜ otherwise
It is worth to stress again that such a value is a continuous numerical repre-
sentation of the preferences of the agents over extended bundles. Hence for
each allocation we will have a vector of such welfare levels. It turns out that
if we pursue the objective of giving priority to the principle of compensation
then such vectors need to be compared using the maxmin rule.
Theorem 1 Let a Social Ordering Function satisfy Strong Pareto,
Nested Preferences Transfer, Equal Preferences Permutation, t˜-Equal Talent
Transfer and Separation. Then, on the domain D, for any mN , m′N ∈ RN+ ,
one has m′NP (e)mN if
miniÊ(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜) > miniÊ(mi, ti, Ri, t˜)
The main drawback of Theorem 1 is that the evaluation function of each
agent depends on the value of the reference talent t˜ that is exogenously fixed
by the social planner. So, a different choice of t˜ might lead to a different
social ordering. We can overcome this difficulty by substituting t˜-Equal
Talent Transfer with Equal Talent Transfer to the Unhappy. Using this
particular weakening of Equal Talent Transfer we are able to endogenize
the choice of the reference talent. More precisely, the introduction of Equal
Talent Transfer to The Unhappy leads to select tH as the reference talent.
Theorem 2 Let a Social Ordering Function satisfy Strong Pareto,
Nested Preferences Transfer, Equal Preferences Permutation, Equal Talent
Transfer to the Unhappy and Separation. Then, on the domain D, for
any mN , m′N ∈ R, one has m′NP (e)mN if
miniÊ(m′i, ti, Ri, t
H) > miniÊ(mi, ti, Ri, tH)
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The fact that, both for Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, no axiom is redundant,
will be shown in the appendix.
Similar results can be found in Fleurbaey and Maniquet [14] and Mani-
quet and Sprumont [17], [18]. They propose maximin criteria that like ours
rely only on ordinal, non-interpersonally comparable, individual preferences.
No ex-ante information about individual utilities is needed in order to
build the social ranking we propose: on the contrary, our axioms single out a
particular welfare representation of individual preferences. The correspond-
ing welfare-level vectors need then to be ranked according to the maximin
criterion: a way of ranking alternatives that gives priority to agents with
a low Ê(.), that is, either agents with a low mi or agents who dislike their
level of talent.
None of the theorems provides a full characterization of social prefer-
ences because they do not tell us how to rank two allocations for which
miniÊ(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜) = miniÊ(mi, ti, Ri, t˜). Nonetheless, as we will see in
the next section, they both give us a criterion to evaluate different compen-
sation policies and, in particular, to single out the optimal one. Moreover,
in both cases, the refinement of the proposed social ordering obtained by ap-
plying the leximin criterion6 to the welfare-level vectors gives us a complete
ranking of the social alternatives and, as can be easily checked, satisfies all
the involved axioms.
4 Incentive Compatible Allocations
With a social ordering function like the one we have introduced in the pre-
vious section, we would obtain, at the optimum, an allocation such that
each agent is indifferent between the extended bundle she receives and a hy-
pothetical extended bundle which is the same for everyone (assuming that
everyone receives a strictly positive transfer). Such an allocation would
be achievable if the social planner knew the talent and the preferences of
each agent. In our framework we can reasonably assume that the former is
known (doctors can establish the degree of disability of an individual) while
individual preferences are typically not observable7.
6Let ≥L denote the usual leximin ordering of Rn+: for any w,w′ ∈ Rn+, w′ ≥L w if and
only if the smallest coordinate of w′ is greater than the smallest coordinate of w or they
are equal but the second smallest coordinate of w′ is greater than the second smallest
coordinate of w and so on
7If the talent was not observable either, the only incentive-compatible allocation would
trivially be the one that gives an equal split of the available resources to each agent.
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Figure 3: Agent b has an incentive to misreport her preferences.
Consider, for instance, the simple three-agent economy depicted in figure
3. At the optimum, we have full compensation between agent a and agent
b. On the other hand, agent b and agent c, who have different preferences
but equal talent, receive a different transfer: mc > mb. This clearly gives an
incentive to agent b to misreveal her preferences. We can however still use
the ranking criterion we have proposed in order to choose the second-best
policy.
Interestingly, we will see that the incentive compatibility constraint con-
siderably shapes our choice between the principle of compensation and the
principle of natural reward. Actually, from the previous example it is easy
to understand that, if the social planner knows the distribution of individual
preferences, an allocation mN ∈ RN is incentive-compatible if and only if
mi = mj for all i, j ∈ N with ti = tj
that is, agents with the same talent should receive the same amount of
resources regardless of their preferences and this is indeed what we should
do if we want to give priority to the principle of natural reward.
For any given economy e ∈ D, let T e and Re denote, respectively, the set
of the different levels of talents and the set of individual preference orderings
we can find in e. Before we show the shape of the optimal incentive compat-
ible allocation we need to introduce two more assumptions. The first one is
nothing but the adaptation to this framework of the Mireless-Spence single
crossing condition: for any couple of preferences ordering R and R′ in Re
we either have that R exhibits a higher degree of inequality aversion to lack
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of talent than R′ or vice versa. This means that it is possible, within each
economy, to rank all the preference orderings with respect to the aversion
to lack of talent they exhibit.
Assumption 1: For each R,R′ ∈ Re, either R A R′ or R′ A R.
Let RH and RL denote the preference orderings in Re with, respectively,
highest and lowest aversion to lack of talent.
The second assumption we introduce is a richness requirement that looks
quite reasonable specially if the number of agent in the economy is consid-
erably large: for any class of agents with a given talent t ∈ T e there is at
least one agent with preferences R, for each R ∈ Re.
Assumption 2: For each (t, R) ∈ T e × Re there exists i ∈ N such that
Ri = R and ti = t
Given any reference talent t˜ chosen from T let N+et = {i ∈ N |ti ≥ t˜} and
N−et = {i ∈ N |ti < t˜}. Consider an incentive-compatible allocation. By As-
sumption 2, for each t ≥ t˜, there is at least one agent with such a talent and
with preferences equal to RL. It is easy to check that, among agents with
the same talent, she is the one with lowest Ê(.). Symmetrically, for each
possible level of talent t, the agents with lowest Ê(.) are those with pref-
erences RH . Since we are using the maximin criterion, we should equalize,
whenever possible, the lowest Ê(.) values across different classes.
Theorem 3 In any economy e = (tN , RN ,M) ∈ D, under Assumptions 1
and 2, if a Social Ordering Function satisfies Strong Pareto, Nested Pref-
erences Transfer, Equal Preferences Permutation, t˜-Equal Talent Transfer
and Separation then, the optimal incentive compatible allocation (metN ) dis-
tributes the available resources in the following way:
for all i, j ∈ N+et , (meti, ti)IL(metj , tj) or meti = 0 and (0, ti)RL(metj , tj).
and
for all i, j ∈ N−et , (meti, ti)IH(metj , tj) or meti = 0 and (0, ti)RH(metj , tj)
Proof. By Theorem 1 we know that if a Social Ordering Function satisfies
the listed axioms then, for any m′N ,mN ∈ RN+ ,
miniÊ(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜) > miniÊ(mi, ti, Ri, t˜) =⇒ m′NP (e)mN
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Figure 4: Proof of Theorem 3.
At metN , given assumption 1 and 2, it holds true that the worst-off agents
are (for a graphical example see figure 4, for simplicity we represent a sit-
uation in which each agent receives a strictly positive transfer) all j ∈ N+et
such that Rj = RL and mj > 0 and all k ∈ N−et such that Rk = RH and
mk > 0:
mini{Ê(meti, ti, t˜, Ri)}i∈N = Ê(metj , tj , t˜, RL) = Ê(metk, tk, t˜, RH).
Assume, by contradiction, that there exists an incentive compatible alloca-
tion m′N such that miniÊ(m
′
i, ti, Ri, t˜) > miniÊ(m
et
i, ti, Ri, t˜). This implies
that, for all j ∈ N+et such that Rj = RL and m′j > 0, m′j > metj and, anal-
ogously, for all k ∈ N−et such that Rh = RH and m′k > 0, m′k > metk. By
incentive compatibility we should then increase by the same amount the
transfer received by all the other agents having the same level of talent but
different preferences. This contradicts that, by construction, metN is an allo-
cation exhausting the available resources. 
The resulting allocation is strongly affected by the incentive compatibility
constraint: people with the same talent receive the same monetary trans-
fer. The scheme we obtain is hence natural-reward minded, nonetheless it
shows us the highest level of priority that we can give to the principle of
compensation given the informational constraints we have to face.
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Figure 5: A different reference talent determines a different compensation
policy.
A consequence of Theorem 3 is that the optimal compensation path cru-
cially depends on the choice of t˜. So, for example, the higher is the reference
talent chosen by the social planner the bigger is the compensation received
by people with a severe disability (see figure 5 (a) and (b)). Moreover, the
proportion of individuals with a low disability is typically higher than the
proportion of agents with a severe disability and the equality of extended
bundles (with respect to the references preferences RH and RL) is performed
here in such a way that it may be impossible to fully compensate some in-
equalities in personal characteristics with the available resources. In that
case, some inequalities persist and the better-off agents are left with no ex-
ternal resource, while only disadvantaged agents receive a strictly positive
monetary compensation. The higher t˜ the more this is likely to happen:
this, in fact, determines a threshold above which m = 0. It is clear that
this gives justification to several compensation schemes used in reality that
choose to leave with no transfer people with a relatively high talent. More-
over it is also interesting to note that the compensation scheme is relatively
smooth if compared with compensation schemes we can observe in reality:
the amount received varies with the level of talent and it is never the case
that people with a different t receive the same transfer (except, of course,
those who are not compensated at all).
At this point it is quite simple to understand the policy implications of
Theorem 2. As we have seen in this case the reference talent is endogenously
determined and is equal to tH . This means that the compensation policy
can no longer be arbitrarily changed by varying the reference talent but fol-
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lows a path that is endogenously determined.
Corollary 1. In any economy e = (tN , RN ,M) ∈ D, under Assumptions 1
and 2, if a Social Ordering Function satisfies Strong Pareto, Nested Pref-
erences Transfer, Equal Preferences Permutation, Equal Talent Transfer to
the Unhappy and Separation then the optimal incentive compatible alloca-
tion (mt
H
N ) distributes the available resources in the following way:
for all i, j ∈ N, (mtHi , ti)IH(mt
H
j , tj) or mi = 0 and (0, ti)R
H(mj , tj)
Such a compensation path gives maximal priority to agents with a lower
talent leaving a relatively big share of the population without any compen-
sation (see figure 5 (c)).
5 Conclusions
In the first part of this paper we have examined how axioms embodying
the principle of compensation and axioms weakly embodying the principle
of natural reward lead to a particular way of evaluating individual welfare
and single out particular social preferences. Such social preferences grant
absolute priority to agents who dislike their level of talent and to agents who
receive a low compensation. The measure of individual situations obtained
here is derived from the fairness principles and the analysis did not require
any other information about individual welfare than ordinal non-comparable
preferences.
It must be stressed again that alternative measures of individual welfare
and alternative social preferences, both responding to different ethical prin-
ciples, could be found. The purpose of our analysis was to see how one could
derive specific policies recommendations from given fairness principles.
The second part of this paper has studied the implications of such social
preferences for the evaluation of incentive compatible-policies. The fact
that incentive constraints prevent the full expression of priority given to the
principle of compensation does not render the principle irrelevant. On the
contrary it tells us to what extent an implementable policy can take this
ethical requirement into account.
The main lesson we can draw from this paper is in fact that leaving a
certain share of the population without a monetary compensation can be
defended on normative grounds, given the scarcity of the available resources
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and the informational constraints. In particular this share is endogenously
determined if we chose a particular weakening of Equal Talent Transfer.
Finally let us briefly discuss the assumptions underlying the analysis.
In Fleurbaey [7] [8] no particular structure is assumed on the set T . Here
Lemma 1,2 and 3 would still hold under the same assumption too. In our
analysis assuming that T has at least some ordinal structure plays a fun-
damental role in the way the social ordering function we propose is built.
As we have seen, many compensation schemes used in reality are based on
indexes that induce a structure on individual talents and handicaps.
Appendix: proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 . Take the economy e = (t, t′, t′, t, R′, R′, R,R ,M) ∈
D, the extended bundles (m1, t), (m2, t), (m3, t), (m4, t), (m5, t′), (m6, t′),
(m7, t′), (m8, t′) and ∆ ∈ R++ with:
m
tH
tL
t′
t
m1 m2 m3 m4••••
m5 m6 m7 m8
• • • •
Figure 6: Equal Preferences Transfer and Equal Talent Transfer are in-
compatible.
1. t 6= t′
2. (m1, t)P (m8, t′)
3. (m5, t′)P ′(m4, t)
4. m4 −∆ = m3 > m2 = m1 + ∆
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5. m8 −∆ = m7 > m6 = m5 + ∆
We give a graphical example of such an economy in figure 6. By Equal Pref-
erences Transfer and conditions 2, 4 and 5, (m1,m8, m5,m3) P (e) (m2,m7,
m5,m3). By Equal Talent Transfer and condition 5, (m1,m7,m6, m3) P (e)
(m1,m8, m5,m3). By Equal Preferences Transfer and conditions 3, 4 and
5, (m1,m7, m5,m4) P (e) (m1,m7,m6, m3). By Equal Talent Transfer and
condition 4, (m2,m7, m5,m3) P (e) (m1,m7, m5,m4). Finally, by tran-
sitivity, (m1,m7,m6,m3) P (e) (m1, m7,m6,m3), which yields the desired
contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 2 . Take the economy e = (t, t, t′, t′, R,R′, R′, R,M) ∈ D,
the extended bundles (m1, t), (m2, t), (m3, t), (m4, t), (m5, t), (m6, t), (m1
′
, t′), (m2′ , t′), (m3′ , t′), (m4′ , t′), (m5′ , t′), (m6′ , t′) with:
tH
tL
t′
t
m
m6 m5 m4m3 m2 m1
••••••
m6
′
m5
′
m4
′
m3
′
m2
′
m1
′
• • • • • •
Figure 7: Strong Pareto, Equal Preferences Permutation and Equal Talent
Permutation are incompatible.
1. t 6= t′
2. m1 > m2 > m3 > m4 > m5 > m6
3. m1
′
> m2
′
> m3
′
> m4
′
> m5
′
> m6
′
4. (m1, t)I(m2
′
, t′) and (m6, t)I(m3′ , t′)
5. (m2, t)I ′(m1′ , t′) and (m3, t)I ′(m6′ , t′)
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A graphical example of such an economy is given in figure 7. By Strong
Pareto and conditions 2 and 3, (m1,m4,m3
′
,m5
′
) P (e) (m2,m5, m4
′
,m6
′
).
By Equal Talent Permutation and condition 3, (m4,m1,m3
′
,m5
′
) I(e) (m1,
m4, m3
′
, m5
′
). By Equal Preferences Permutation and condition 4, (m4,m6,
m2
′
,m5
′
) I(e) (m4,m1, m3
′
,m5
′
). By Equal Talent Permutation and con-
dition 3, (m4,m6, m2
′
,m5
′
) I(e) (m4,m6,m5
′
,m2
′
). By Strong Pareto and
conditions 2 and 3, (m3,m5, m4
′
,m1
′
) P (e) (m4,m6,m5
′
,m2
′
). By Equal
Preferences Permutation and condition 5, (m2,m5,m4
′
,m6
′
) I(e) (m3,m5,
m4
′
,m1
′
). Finally by transitivity, we have (m2,m5,m4
′
,m6
′
) P (e)
(m2,m5, m4
′
,m6
′
), a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Let R satisfy Nested Preferences Transfer, Equal Pref-
erences Permutation and Separation. Let e = (tN , RN ,M) ∈ D, mN ,m′N ∈
RN+ , j, k ∈ N be such that:
(mj , tj)Pj(m′j , tj)Pj(m
′
k, tk)Pk(mk, tk),
U(m′j , Rj)
⋂
L(m′k, Rk) = ∅,
and for all i 6= j, k, mi = m′i. We want to prove that m′NP (e)mN . Let
4j = (mj − m′j) and 4k = (m′k − mk). Let b, c ∈ N++ \ N , Rb, Rc ∈
R, tb, tc, m1b ,m2b ,m1c ,m2c ∈ R+ and q ∈ N++, be defined in such a way
that: Rb = Rc; (m1b , tb)Ib(m
1
c , tc) and (m
2
b , tb)Ib(m
2
c , tc); m
1
b = m
2
b +
4k
q
and m1c = m
2
c +
4j
q ; (m
2
b , tb)Pb(m
′
k, tk), U((m
2
b , tb), Rb)
⋂
L((m′k, tk), Rk) =
∅, (m′j , tj)Pj(m1b , tb) and U((m′j , tj), Rj)
⋂
L((m1b , tb), Rb) = ∅. Let e′ =
(tN , tb, tc, RN , Rb, Rc,M) ∈ D (an example of such a construction is given
in figure 8).
By Nested Preferences Transfer,
(mN\{k},mk +
4k
q ,m
2
b ,m
1
c)P (e
′)(mN ,m1b ,m
1
c).
By Equal Preferences Permutation,
(mN\{k},mk +
4k
q ,m
1
b ,m
2
c)I(e
′)(mN\{k},mk +
4k
q ,m
2
b ,m
1
c).
By Nested Preferences Transfer,
(mN\{k,j},mk +
4k
q ,mj −
4j
q ,m
1
b ,m
1
c)P (e
′)(mN\{k},mk +
4k
q ,m
1
b ,m
2
c).
By transitivity,
(mN\{k,j},mk +
4k
q ,mj −
4j
q ,m
1
b ,m
1
c)P (e
′)(mN ,m1b ,m
1
c).
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Figure 8: From Nested Preferences Transfer to Nested Preferences Priority.
Replicating the argument q times yields
(mN\{k,j},mk +4k,mj −4j ,m1b ,m1c)P (e′)(mN ,m1b ,m1c).
Since mj − 4j = m′j and mk + 4k = m′k, by replacing into the former
equation one obtains
(m′N ,m
1
b ,m
1
c)P (e
′)(mN ,m1b ,m
1
c).
Finally, by Separation,
m′NP (e)mN ,
the desired result. 
Proof of Theorem 1 . Let R be a social ordering function that satisfies
Strong Pareto, Nested Preferences Transfer, Equal Preferences Permutation,
t˜-Equal Talent Transfer and Separation. Choose any t˜ ∈ R+. By Lemma
3, the social ordering function R also satisfies Nested Preferences Priority.
For the sake of clarity the remaining of the proof is divided in two steps.
Step 1 . Consider two allocations mN and m′N and two different agents j
and k such that for all i 6= j, k, mi = m′i. Let
Êm = min{Ê(mj , tj , Rj , t˜), Ê(m′j , tj , Rj , t˜), Ê(m′k, tk, Rk, t˜).}
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Without loss of generality, let us assume that Ê(mk, tk, Rk, t˜) < Êm. We
want to prove that m′NP (e)mN . If we also have m
′
j > mj then by Strong
Pareto we immediately get the desired result. Consider now the case mj >
m′j and assume, by contradiction, that mNR(e)m
′
N . We have to examine
two possible cases.
•Case 1 : Ê(mk, tk, Rk, t˜) < 0.
Let b, c ∈ N++ \ N , Rb, Rc ∈ R, tb, tc ∈ T , mb,mc,m′′k ∈ R+ be defined in
such a way that: (a graphical example of the following construction is given
in figure 9):
tH
tj
tb = tc
tk
tL m
t˜
•
mk
• •
m′k
•
m′j
•
mj
mcmb
m′′k
• •ε •mc − ε •  
•t̂k
•
m̂′j •̂
m′k •
m̂j
Figure 9: Case 1.
1. t̂k < tb = tc < t˜ if m̂m exists, t̂k < tb = tc < t̂m otherwise
2. Rk = Rb and Rj = Rc
3. 0 = mb < mc and (m′j , tj)Pj(mc, tc)
4. mk < m′′k < m
′
k and (mb, tb)Pk(m
′′
k, tk).
Let e′ = (tj , tk, Rj , Rk,M), e′′ = (tj , tk, tb, tc, Rj , Rk, Rb, Rc,M) ∈ D. Since
we have assumed mNR(e)m′N then, by Separation, we have (mj ,mk)
R(e′) (m′j ,m
′
k). Take any ε such that 0 < ε <
mc
2 . By Separation again
(mj ,mk,mb+ε,mc−ε) R(e′′) (m′j ,m′k,mb+ε,mc−ε). By Nested Preferences
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Priority and conditions 2 and 3, (m′j ,mk,mb + ε,mc) P (e
′′) (mj ,mk,mb +
ε,mc−ε). By Nested Preferences Priority and conditions 2 and 4, (m′j ,m′′k,
mb,mc) P (e′′) (m′j ,mk, mb + ε,mc). By Strong Pareto and condition 4,
(m′j ,m
′
k,mb,mc) P (e
′′) (m′j ,m
′′
k,mb,mc). By Transitivity, (m
′
j ,m
′
k,mb,mc)
P (e′′) (m′j ,m
′
k,mb + ε,mc− ε). This is true for each ε such that 0 < ε < mc2
hence, given condition 1 and 3, it represents a violation of t˜-Equal Talent
Transfer and yields the desired contradiction so that m′NP (e)mN
•Case 2 : Ê(mk, tk, Rk, t˜) ≥ 0.
Let b, c ∈ N++ \ N , Rb, Rc ∈ R, tb, tc ∈ T , mb,m′b,mc,m′c,m′′k ∈ R+,∆ ∈
R++ be defined in such a way that: (for a graphical example of the following
construction see figure 10):
tH
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•
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•
m′′k
•
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•
m′j
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•
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•
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Figure 10: Case 2.
(5) tb = tc = t˜
(6) Rk = Rb and Rj = Rc
(7) Ê(mk, tk, Rk, t˜) < m′b < m
′
c < Êm and m
′
b + ∆ = mb < mc = m
′
c −∆
(8) mk < m′′k and (mb, tb)Pk(m
′′
k, tk).
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Let e′ = (tj , tk, Rj , Rk,M), e′′ = (tj , tk, tb, tc, Rj , Rk, Rb, Rc,M) ∈ D.
Since we have assumed mNR(e)m′N then, by Separation we have re-
spectively, (mj ,mk) R(e′) (m′j ,m
′
k) and (mj ,mk,mb,mc) R(e
′′) (m′j ,m
′
k,
mb,mc). By Nested Preferences Priority and conditions 6 and 7, (m′j ,mk,
mb,m
′
c) P (e
′′) (mj ,mk,mb,mc). By Nested Preferences Priority and condi-
tions 6,7 and 8, (m′j ,m
′′
k,m
′
b,m
′
c) P (e
′′) (m′j ,mk,mb,m
′
c). By Strong Pareto
and condition 8, (m′j ,m
′
k,m
′
b,m
′
c) P (e
′′) (m′j ,m
′′
k, m
′
b,m
′
c). By Transitivity,
(m′j ,m
′
k,m
′
b,m
′
c) P (e
′′) (m′j ,m
′
k,mb,mc), which, given conditions 5 and 7,
is a violation of t˜-Equal Talent Transfer and again yields the desired con-
tradiction so that m′NP (e)mN .
Step 2 . Take now two allocations mN and m′N such that
miniÊ(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜) > miniÊ(mi, ti, Ri, t˜).
Then, by monotonicity of preferences, one can find two allocations mN , m′N
such that for all i, mi < mi, m′i < m
′
i , and there exists i0 such that for all
i 6= i0
Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜) > Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜) > Ê(m
′
i0
, ti0 , Ri0 , t˜) > Ê(mi0 , ti0 , Ri0 , t˜).
Let Q = N\{i0} and consider a sequence of allocations (mqN )1≤q≤|Q|+1 such
that
mqi = m
′
i for all i ∈ Q such that i < q
mqi = mi for all i ∈ Q such that i ≥ q
while
m′i0 = m
|Q|+1
i0
> m
|Q|
i0
> ... > m1i0 = mi0 .
This entails that for all q ∈ Q
Ê(mqq, tm, Rm, t˜) > Ê(m
q+1
q , tm, Rk, t˜) > Ê(m
q+1
i0
, ti0 , Ri0 , t˜) >
Ê(mqi0 , ti0 , Ri0 , t˜),
while for all q ∈ Q, and all i 6= i0, q, mqi = mq+1i . By Step 1, mq+1N P (e)mqN
for all q ∈ Q. By Strong Pareto, m′NP (e)m|Q|+1N and m1NP (e)mN . By
transitivity, m′NP (e)mN . 
Examples of social ordering functions satisfying all the axioms but:
1. Strong Pareto. Compare the welfare-level vectors using the lexico-
graphic minimax criterion: a distribution is at least as good as another
one if its maximum is lower, or they are equal and the second highest
value is lower, or... or they are all equal.
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2. Nested Preferences Transfer. Let R be defined by: for all e ∈ D,
mN ,m
′
N ∈ R+N , if
(Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N >L (Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N
and there exist k, k′ ∈ N with tk 6= tk′ such that
0 < Ê(mk, tk, Rk, t˜) < Ê(m′k, ti, Ri, t˜) < Ê(m
′
k′ , tk, Rk, t˜) <
Ê(mk′ , ti, Ri, t˜),
with Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜) = Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜) for all i 6= k, k′, then m′NI(e)mN .
In all other cases m′NP (e)mN . If
(Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N =L (Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N
then m′NI(e)mN .
3. Equal Preferences Permutation. Let R be defined by: for all e ∈ D,
mN ,m
′
N ∈ R+N , if
(Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N >L (Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N
or
(Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N =L (Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N
and there exist k, k′ ∈ N with tk′ 6= tk such that Ê(mk, tk, Rk, t˜) <
Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜) for all i 6= k; Ê(m′k′ , tk′ , Rk′ , t˜) < Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜) for all
i 6= k′, then m′NP (e)mN . In all other cases m′NI(e)mN .
4. t˜-Equal Talent Transfer. Let R be defined by: for all e ∈ D, mN ,m′N ∈
R+N , if
(Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N >L (Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N
and there exist k, k′ ∈ N with Rk′ 6= Rk such that
Ê(mk, tk, Rk, t˜) < Ê(m′k, ti, Ri, t˜) < Ê(m
′
k′ , tk, Rk, t˜) <
Ê(mk′ , ti, Ri, t˜),
with Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜) = Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜) for all i 6= k, k′ and U((m′k′ , t′k), R′k)⋂
L((m′k, tk), Rk) 6= ∅, then m′NI(e)mN . In all other cases m′NP (e)mN .
If
(Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N =L (Ê(m
′
i, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N
then m′NI(e)mN .
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5. Separation. Let R be defined by: in all economies such that there is
an agent k ∈ N such that tk = t˜, for all mN ,m′N ∈ R+N
(Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N ≥L (Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜))i∈N ⇐⇒ m′NR(e)mN .
In all other economies
(Ê(m′i, ti, Ri, t˜
′))i∈N ≥L (Ê(mi, ti, Ri, t˜′))i∈N ⇐⇒ m′NR(e)mN
with t˜ 6= t˜′.
Proof of Theorem 2 . The proof mostly parallels the proof of theorem 1.
We only need to prove case 2 of step 1 which is now divided in two different
subcases:
•Case 2a: Ê(mk, tk, Rk, t˜) ≥ 0 and Rk A Rj .
Let b, c ∈ N++ \N , Rb, Rc ∈ R, tb, tc ∈ T , mb,m′b,mc,m′c,m′′k ∈ R+,∆ ∈
R++ be defined in such a way that (see figure 11):
tH = t˜
tj
tk
tL m
  •
mk
•
m′′k
•
m′k
•m
′
j •mj
•m
′
b •
mb •
mc •
m′c•
m̂k •̂
m′j •̂
m′k •̂
mj
Figure 11: Case 2a.
1. tb = tc = t˜ = tH
2. Rk = Rb and Rj = Rc
3. Ê(mk, tk, Rk, t˜) < m′b < m
′
c < Êm and m
′
b + ∆ = mb ≤ mc = m′c −∆
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4. mk < m′′k and (mb, tb)Pk(m
′′
k, tk).
Let e′ = (tj , tk, Rj , Rk,M), e′′ = (tj , tk, tb, tc, Rj , Rk, Rb, Rc,M) ∈ D. As in
the previous proof we assume, mNR(e)m′N . By applying Separation twice
we have (mj ,mk) R(e′) (m′j ,m
′
k) and (mj ,mk,mb,mc) R(e
′′) (m′j ,m
′
k, mb,
mc). By Nested Preferences Priority and conditions 2, 3 and 4, (m′j ,mk,mb,
m′c) P (e′′) (mj ,mk,mb,mc) and (m′j ,m
′′
k, m
′
b,m
′
c) P (e
′′) (m′j ,mk,mb,m
′
c).
By Strong Pareto and condition 4, (m′j ,m
′
k,m
′
b,m
′
c) P (e
′′) (m′j ,m
′′
k,m
′
b,m
′
c).
By Transitivity, (m′j ,m
′
k, m
′
b,m
′
c) P (e
′′) (m′j ,m
′
k,mb,mc), which, given
conditions 1 and 2, is a violation of Equal Talent Transfer to the Unhappy
since, by construction, Rb A Rc. This yields the desired contradiction so
that m′NP (e)mN .
•Case 2b: Ê(mk, tk, Rk, t˜) ≥ 0. and Rj A Rk.
If we have Ê(m′k, tk, Rk, t˜) < Ê(m
′
j , tj , Rj , t˜) then directly by Nested Pref-
erence Transfer we get the desired result. On the other hand assume
tH = t˜
tj
tk
tL m
•m
′
j •
mj
•
mk
•
m′′k •m
′
k
•
m̂k •̂
m′j •̂
mj
•
m̂′k
Figure 12: Case 2b.
Ê(m′k, tk, Rk, t˜) ≥ Ê(m′j , tj , Rj , t˜). and, again by contradiction mNR(e)m′N .
Consider m′′k such that mk < m
′′
k < m
′
k, (m
′
j , tj)Pj (m
′′
k, tk) and U((m
′
j , tj), Rj)⋂
L((m′′k, tk), Rk) = ∅. Let e′ = (tj , tk, Rj , Rk,M). By Separation we have
(mj ,mk) R(e′)(m′j ,m
′
k). By Nested Preferences Priority, (m
′′
k,m
′
j)P (e
′)
(mk,mj). By Strong Pareto, (m′k,m
′
j) P (e
′)(mk,mj) which yields the de-
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sired contradiction. The remaining of the proof exactly parallels Step 2 of
the previous one. 
The examples used previously can be easily adapted here to see that no
axiom is redundant.
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